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SECONDARY BOYCOTTS UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
foJHN J. IRWIN, JR.*
Among organized labor's most potent economic weapons have been
secondary pressures of one kind or another, and these weapons along
with the use of the injunction by employers to combat them have
been the cause of much controversy in the field of labor law. In
the early days of the twentieth century, largely as an outgrowth of
the Debs' case and the Danbury Hatters2 case, the repressive in-
junction became widely used to counteract union activities. Con-
gress allegedly attempted to grant relief against the indiscriminate
use of the injunction in labor disputes by the passage of the Clayton
Act3 in 1914. It seems that an ordinary interpretation of Section
20 of this Act would be that the use of the injunction by federal courts
to stop secondary boycotts was outlawed. However, as is well known
to lawyers, if not to everyone, words are not always what they seem,
or even what they are intended to be, and organized labor's hopes
were short-lived. The Supreme Court of the United States in the
Duplex Printing Press Company4 case and the Bedford Cut Stone5
*B.S., University of South Carolina; LL.B., University of South Carolina; LL.M., Duke
University. Member of bar of South Carolina. Assistant Professor, School of Law, Creigh-
ton University, Omaha, Nebraska.
1. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895), in which a federal injunction against
unions was allowed.
2. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522
(1915), where it was held that a combination of labor organizations and the
members thereof, to compel a manufacturer whose goods were almost entirely
sold in other states, to unionize his shops and on his refusal to do so to boycott
his goods and prevent their sale in states other than his own until such time as
the resulting damage forces him to comply with their demands, is a combina-
tion in restraint of interstate commerce within the meaning of the ANTI-TRUST
AcT of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1-7, 1946), and that the
manufacturer could mairitain an action for triple damages under § 7 of the Act.
3. CLAYToN ANTi-TRusT ACT, 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1946).
4. Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921). For
the purpose of compelling a manufacturer of printing presses to unionize its
factory in Michigan, in which there had been an unsuccessful strike, and to
enforce there the "closed shop", the eight-hour day and the union scale of
wages, organizations of machinists with headquarters at New York City, and
a larger organization of national scope with which they were affiliated, entered
into a combination to interfere with and restrain the manufacturer's interstate
trade by means of a secondary boycott, centered particularly at New York
City and vicinity where many of the presses were marketed. This manufac-
turer's customers in and near New York City were warned, with threats of
loss and of sympathetic strikes in other trades, not to purchase or install
Duplex presses. A trucking company usually employed by customers was
notified, with threats, not to haul them. Employees of the trucking company
and of customers were incited to strike in order to prevent both hauling and
installation. Repair shops were notified not to repair them. Union men were
coerced by the threat of loss of their union cards and of being blacklisted as
1
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case held that Section 20 of the Clayton Act did not actually enunci-
ate any new principles with respect to secondary boycotts and in-
junctions, but was merely declaratory of previously existing law,
and in both cases the unions were held to have engaged in illegal
secondary boycott activities. After these decisions, organized labor
was, in fact, in a much more disadvantageous position than before
the passage of the Clayton Act since Section 16 of this Act authorized
a private person to obtain the injunction.
Organized labor achieved definite and substantial recognition of
its right to engage in secondary boycott activities without fear of
injunction with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 6 in 1932.
Also the passage of the Wagner Act7 , by which the National Labor
Relations Board came into existence, saw the Federal Government
giving assistance to the organizational efforts of labor. After these
acts were passed, organized labor enjoyed much freedom of activity,
this freedom reaching its zenith in the so-called "free speech" cases,
a brief resume of which follows.
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,8 decided in 1937, was the
first case to link picketing with free speech. In 1940, Thornhill v.
Alabama9 and Carlson v. California,10 decided on the same day, held
that a state statute and city ordinance, respectively, which were so
broadly drawn as to prohibit all picketing per se were violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits state action abridging
either freedom of speech or of the press. In the case of American
"scabs" if they assisted in installing them. All of this seriously interfered
with the interstate trade of the manufacturer and caused great loss to -its
business. The Court held such activities to be a secondary boycott and a com-
bination and conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce against which the manu-
facturer was entitled to relief by injunction under the Sherman Act, as amended
by the Clayton Act.
5. Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association,
274 U. S. 37 (1927), where it was held that a combination or conspiracy of
union stone-cutters to restrain the interstate commerce of certain building-
stone producers by declaring their stone "unfair" and forbidding members of
the union to work upon it in building construction in other states, for which
it was extensively bought and used, and thereby coercing or inducing local
employers to refrain from purchasing it, was a violation of the anti-trust
laws; and the fact that the ultimate object was to unionize the cutters and
carvers of stone at the quarries of the producers did not make the combina-
tion lawful. The Court also held that a private suit to enjoin a combination
violative of the Sherman Act will lie under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,
where there is a dangerous probability of injury to the plaintiff, though no
actual injury has been suffered.
6. 47 STAT. 90 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 et seq.
7. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 49 STAT. 372 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151
et s eq.
8. 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
9. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
10. 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
2
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Federation of Labor v. Swing," decided in 1941, the free speech
doctrine was again declared to limit the right of the states in restrict-
ing peaceful picketing. 12 In that case the Court held that the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was infringed by the com-
mon law policy of a state prohibiting peaceful picketing by labor
unions on the sole ground that the controversy was not between
the employer and his own employees. This does not mean that a
state cannot forbid peaceful picketing at a place having no business
connection with the place where the industrial dispute centered.'
3
The Supreme Court has also upheld a decree enjoining peaceful
picketing where it was carried on for the purpose of coercing the
employer to violate a state's anti-trust law.' 4 And the fact that
there are no criminal sanctions in the law regulating peaceful picket-
ing is not controlling.' 5 In other words, the Supreme Court has
only identified picketing with free speech and has pointed to the
constitutional restraints on the prohibition of picketing per se, but
it has recognized that a state may by regulations under its police
power place reasonable limitations on the right of free speech.
The extent of the freedom of union activity was demonstrated by
the Hutcheson'6 case, which held that the Sherman, Clayton, and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts must be read and construed together, and,
so read and construed, the labor union activities enumerated in Sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act are not punishable as criminal under the
Sherman Act.
It was thought by many that the pendulum had swung too far on
the side of labor, and Congress, yielding to the pressure of wide-
spread public opinion, devised inter alia Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.'7  All secondary boycott activities by unions in
11. 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
12. For other applications of the doctrine see Bakery & Pastry Drivers &
Helpers Local 802, etc. v. Woh, 315 U. S. 769 (1942) and Cafeteria Employ-
ees Union Local 301 et al. v. Angelos et al., 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
13. "As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful
picketing may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance. But
recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply
that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication
to that directly related to the dispute." Carpenters and Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 727 (1942).
14. "It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. Ve reject the contention
now." Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U. S. 490, 498
(1949).
15. Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532 (1950).
16. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
17. LABOR MANAGEMZNT RELATioNs Acr, 1947, 61 STAT. 136 et seq. (1947);
29 U. S. C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
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those sittiation's otherwise satisfying -the interstate commerce re-
quirements of tfie Act were outlawed. Neither Section 8(b) (4) (A)
nor subsecti6ns' (B), (C), or (D) mention secondaiy boycotts spe-
cifically, but they are commonly referred to as the "secondary boy-
cott sections" 6f the Act. In fact the wording of the section seems
to fit Giegory's18 definition of a secondary boycott as
"the refusal by one party to deal with another unless such other
will, in turn, refuse to deal with a third- the real object of the
first party's animus".
The use of this terminology would appear to be justified from
the legislative history of the Act although a literal reading of the
sections would seem to outlaw primary as well as secondary activities.
Indeed a partisan scrutiny of the legislative history can produce
argumerits for either view.
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare19
gave an example of the type of activity Sectiori 8(b) (4) (A) was
intended to prevent: a union strikes or boycotts employer A, a
neutral, to force him to cease doing business with employer B. The
use of this example evidences a desire to proscribe economic pres-
sure on a neutral employer.
On April 29, 1947, Senator Pepper argued that there were good
boycotts and bad boycotts and claimed that the bill covered both the
good and the bad, "primary and secondary". In reply, Senator Taft
said that the bill covered only the secondary boycott situation and
that the broad language was chosen because the drafters found it
impossible to distinguish between the various labor practices which
interfere with a secondary employer.
20
The penalties available against unions for violations of these
"secondary boycott sections" include:
(a) The issuance of a temporary injunction from the appro-
priate district court upon application by the Regional Director
of the National Labor Relations Board, on the condition that
the Regional Director has reasonable grounds for believing that
an unfair labor practice exists. (It is mandatory under Sec-
tion 10(1) of the Act to seek such a temporary restraining
order, if the Regional Director has such reasonable grounds. It
is interesting to note in this connection that in cases of em-
18. G1XGORY, LABOR AND THn LAW, (Revised Edition, 1949), p. 34.
19. Snr. RPP. No. 105, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 20 (1947).
20. 93 CoNG. Rme. 4197-4200 (1947). Also see 93 CoNG. Rtc. 3838, 4178,
4323, 5014, 6503 (1947).
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ployer violations of the unfair labor practices section; it is not
mandatory, acording to Section 10(j), for the Regional Di-
rector to seek a temporary restraining order.)
(b) A cease and desist order may issue from the National
Labor Relations Board under Section 10(c) of the Act, and such
order is enforceable by the Circuit Court of Appeals under Sec-
tion 10(e).
(c) A suit for damages by "whoever shall be injured" is
provided for under Section 303 of the Act.
It may be some consolation, however small, to the labor organiza-
tions that the injunction against labor unions for violation of the
secondary boycott provisions of the Act cannot be obtained by private
persons.
IT.
Although this article will deal more in detail with the broad pro-
visions of Section 8(b) (4) (A),* it is deemed appropriate that some
mention be made of the other "secondary boycott sections" of the
Act.**
Section 8(b) (4) (B) outlaws secondary activities where the ob-
ject is to force any other employer to recognize or bargain with an
uncertified union. 1 It is difficult to see how it would not also violate
*"8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents -
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is:
"(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person;"
**"(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with
a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 9;
"(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a par-
ticular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9;
"(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to em-
ployees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for em-
ployees performing such work."
1. Construction and General Laborers Union- (Armco Drainage & Metal
Products, Inc.), 27 L. R. R. M. 1460 (NLRB 1951).
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Section 8(b) (4) (A). For example, X union is uncertified and it
induces the employees of Y company (any employer) to refuse to
work on materials produced by Z company in order to force Z com-
pany (any other employer) to bargain with X union. This is pro-
hibited by Section 8(b) (4) (B). However, is there not also a vio-
lation of Section 8(b) (4) (A)? As a practical matter, how will
Y's employees affect Z except by forcing Y to cease doing business
with Z. It seems to this writer that there are two proscribed ob-
jects involved in such cases although one may be only incidental to
the other, or merely a means to an end.
Section 8(b) (4) (C) bans primary, as well as secondary, activity
which involves encouragement of employee work stoppages in order
to force any employer to bargain with a union where another union
has been certified. It would seem, however, that a newly certified
union is not always protected against picketing of its shop by its
rival in the late certification election. The striking union may con-
tinue picketing by chaining the purpose to some legitimate object,2
but the picketing union's purpose would appear to be suspect in such
a case.
Section 8(b) (4) (D) reflects the opinion of Congress that juris-
dictional disputes should not plague employers. These disputes
should be settled by the unions or the government, and provision
is made in Section 10(k) requiring the Board to hear and determine
such disputes. The Section was primarily designed to protect an
employer who is caught in the middle between two unions of his
employees engaged in a dispute over who should perform particular
work, but it has been applied where the dispute is really between
an employer and a union.3 As a result a violation was found where
the union picketed an employer who refused to hire its members to
perform functions already assigned to existing employees.
A violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) produced the first cease and
desist order by the National Labor Relations Board against a labor
union in the Schenley4 case. In that case the union was engaged in
a primary strike against a liquor manufacturer's wholly-owned sub-
sidiary for the purpose of forcing a contract renewal. Allegedly,
in order to lend support to the strike, warehouse employees of in-
2. Brown v. Retail Salesman's Union, 26 L. R. R. M. 2225, 89 Fed. Supp. 207
(ND Calif. 1950).
3. Hod Carriers Union- (Middle States Telephone Co.), 26 L. R. R. M.
1553 (NLRB 1950). Teamsters Union- (Direct Transit Lines, Inc.), 27
L. V. R. M. 1316 (NLRB, 1951).
4. In re Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local 1, and Schenley
Distillers Corp. (Frankfort, Ky.), 22 L. R. R.. M. 1222 (NLRB 1948).
6
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dependent distributor firms handling the manufacturer's products
called a work stoppage and refused to handle the manufacturer's
products. These employees were members of a "sister" local of the
union involved in the manufacturer's dispute.
There was some evidence that the work stoppage at the warehouse
was due, at least partially, to grievances between the warehouse em-
ployees and the distributors. On the other hand, it was obvious
that one of the objects of such a work stoppage was to force the dis-
tributor to cease doing business with the manufacturer and thus
bring secondary pressure to bear on the manufacturer to force him
to renew the contract with his employees.
The Board held that an objective appraisal of the union's activity
at the warehouses indicated that at least one of its purposes, even
though not necessarily the principal one, was to engage in a secon-
dary boycott against the manufacturer and that this was all that was
required to find a violation under Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Board's
findings,5 and the Supreme Court of the United States also adheres
to this view.
6
If "an object" were literally interpreted, all strikes would be out-
lawed. Certainly it is "an object" of very many, if not all, strikes
and picket lines to induce a reduction of the struck employer's busi-
ness by an appeal to customers-"any person"- to cease dealing
with the struck employer. However, "an object" of all strikes and
picket lines is not to bring secondary pressure on another employer
in aid of the employees of the struck employer. Any such pressure
is just one of the incidental "effects," not "objects," of a genuine
primary strike.
Although many of the decisions involve the question of the free
speech aspect of picketing, there have been a number of judicial
interpretations of Section 8(b) (4) (A) arising out of petitions to
the district courts for temporary restraining orders for alleged vio-
lations of the secondary boycott sections of the Act. Some of the
district court decisions 7 indicate an inclination to find fewer viola-
s. 25 L. R. R. M. 2137, 178 Fed. 2d 584 (CA 2, 1949).
6. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, AFI, v.
National Labor Relations Board, 341 U. S. 694 (1951).
7. Slater v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 22 L. R. R. M.
2565, 81 Fed. Supp. 490 (DC Colorado, 1948); Sperry v. Denver Building &
Construction Trades Council, 21 L. R. R. M. 2712, 77 Fed. Supp. 321 (DC
Colorado, 1948); Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 21 L. R.
R. M. 2256, 75 Fed. Supp. 672 (SD N. Y. 1948).
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tions of the sections than thie National Labor Relations Boafd. How-
ever, the Board has experienced little difficulty in obtaining tempor-
ary injunctions against unions in the district courts. Undoubtedly
the courts have been influenced by the fact that they need ascertain
only that the Board has reasonable grounds for believing an unfair
labor practice exists; but it has been held that prior to granting in-
junctive relief, the district court should inquire into the reasonable-
ness of the charge and evaluate the evidence to determine whether or
not the Board has established a prinma facie case.8
To warrant the finding of an unfair labor practice, two factor§
must combine:
(1) the alleged activities must have as an object the forcing
or requiring any employer "to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer . . . or to cease doing business with any other per-
son," and
(2) the activities must constitute a strike or an inducement
or encouragement of employees in the course of their employ-
ment to refuse "to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services".
The absence of either factor will defeat the charge of a violation of
Section 8(b) (4) (A). 9
There is no violation when the union's request is made to the
secondary employer' 0 or to supervisors of secondary employers"l
because the section forbids inducement or encouragement only when
directed to non-supervisory employees of the secondary employer.
A condition which closely resembles a secondary boycott, but which
is, nevertheless, distinct from it, is one which develops from a con-
tractual undertaking between the secondary employer and the ag-
grieved labor organization. The Board has ruled that "hot goods"
contracts are not in conflict with Section 8(b) (4) (A).12 In so
ruling the Board points out that the boycott prohibition does not
forbid a union to encourage a secondary employer to stop doing
8. Douds v. Confectionery & Tobacco Jobbers Employees Union, 24 L. R.
R. M. 2120, 85 Fed. Supp. 191 (SD N. Y. 1949).
9. Elliott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL, 26 L. R. R. M. 2577, 91 Fed. Supp. 690 (WD Mo. 1950).
10. Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 23 L. R. R. M. 1572 (NLRB 1949).
11. Humphrey v. Local 294 Teamsters Union, 25 L. R. R. M. 2318 (ND
N. Y. 1950).
12. Teamsters Union (Arkansas Express, Inc.), 27 L. R. R. M. 1077 (NLRB
1950).
8
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business with a struck company. The only ban involves attempts to
induce the boycott by urging "employees" of the secondary em-
ployer to refuse to process the struck work. Hence a "struck work"
clause in a contract between a union and an employer is perfectly
legal.
'IH.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the courts developed the "totality
of conduct"' doctrine that statements by employers in order to be
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States must neither constitute threats nor promises, and that con-
duct, though evidenced in part by speech, may amount, in connection
with other circumstances, to coercion within the meaning of the
Wagner Act. If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce
his employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled
to the protection of the Act. And in determining whether a course
of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally
(or by writing) by'ihe employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted in other ways.
This doctrine has been carried over after the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act and applied in a number of cases,2 and this was no
doubt what Congress intended since Senator Taft said in the Senate
debates that all Section 8(c) did was to freeze into lav the present
rule of the Supreme Court (totality of conduct).$ Probably the
most realistic suggestion as to the intent of Congress in writing Sec-
tion 8(c) is that it was inserted at the behest of industry to permit
management to discuss conditions of employment with its employees.
Therefore, with the intent of Congress reasonably clear that it sought
to prohibit Section 8(b) (4) (A) boycotts at any cost, and that Sec-
1. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Labor Board, 7 L. R. R. M. 282,
311 U. S. 72 (Sup. C. of U. S. 1940); Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. N. L.
R. B., 7 L. R. R. M. 524, 116 Fed. 2d 760 (CCA 7 1940); Labor Board v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 9 L. R. R. M. 405, 314 U. S. 469 (Sup. Ct. of
U. S. 1941); N. L. R. B. v. Continental Oil Co., 19 L. R. R. M. 2224, 121
Fed. 2d 120 (CA 10 1947).
2. N. L. R. B. v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 21 L. R. R. M. 2695, 167 Fed. 2d
647 (CA 5 1948) ; N. L. R. B. v. Kropp Forge Co., 25 L. R. R. M. 2219, 178
Fed. 2d 822 (CA 7 1949) ; and other cases.
3. Senator Taft in opening the debates in the Senate declared that the pro-
vision guaranteeing free speech to employers "carries out approximately the
present rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States. It freezes
that rule into law itself, rather than to leave employers dependent on future
decisions." 93 CONG. REc. 3952 (Apr. 23, 1947). The section itself reads:
"(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not con-
stitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit."
9
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tion 8(c) was not specifically designed to protect picketing, the ,Su-
preme Court in the I.B.E.W.4 case held the specific provirsion of Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A) predominates over the general provisions of Sec-
tion 8(c).
Apparently, free speech is not the controlling factor where the
tangible objective of a striking labor organization is contrary to law
and under such circumstances illegal picketing may properly be en-
joined. The "totality of conduct" doctrine was developed as an aid
in determining whether speech by the employer was for an unlawful
purpose (coercion or restraint of his employees) ; it would seem to
be equally applicable in determining whether speech by the union
was for an unlawful purpose (inducing or encouraging, etc.).
The Supreme Court in the International Rice Milling Company5
case held that inasmuch as Section 13 of the Act provides that nothing
in the statute shall be construed so as to impede the right to strike,
all other parts of the Act, including the secondary strike ban of
Section 8(b) (4), should be interpreted to diminish the right to
strike only if there is a specific provision to that effect. Since there
is no specific provision in Section 8(b) (4) banning primary picket-
ing for recognition, such picketing is not unlawful under that section.
Also the fact that a union uses violent, rather than peaceful, picket-
ing or other means to "induce or encourage" action by employees of
a neutral employer does not, in itself, make the union's activities un-
lawful under the secondary strike ban of Section 8(b) (4), because
that provision is directed against the object of a union's "inducement
or encouragement" rather than against the means used to accomplish
it.
Picketing at the premises of a primary employer is traditionally
recognized as primary action even though it is necessarily designed
to induce and encourage third persons to cease doing business with
the picketed employer. The test of legality of picketing under this
section is that enunciated by the National Labor Relations Board in
the Pure Oil6 and Ryan Construction7 cases. In the former, the
union was engaged in a dispute with the Standard Oil Company and
placed pickets at the Standard Oil Company's dock, the effect of
which was to dissuade Pure Oil Company employees from unloading
and removing the oil destined for the Pure Oil Company. The Board
4. I. B. E. W. Local 501, AFL v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694 (1951).
5. N. L. R. B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665 (1951).
6. Oil Workers International Union, Local 346 CIO (The Pure Oil Com-
pany), 24 L. R. R. M. 1239 (NLRB 1949).
7. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (Ryan Construc-
tion Corp.), 24 L. R. R. M. 1424 (NLRB 1949).
10
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held that the picketing was primary although one of the effects of
such picketing is to persuade others to cease doing business with the
struck employer and by its very nature will inconvenience those who
customarily do business with the struck employer. The Board said
that Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act was aimed at secondary and
not primary action. This appears to be true from the legislative his-
tory of the Act In the Ryan Construction case, supra, the Board
held that there was no violation of the Section by picketing a gate
which had been cut through a fence on premises where employees
were on strike to provide ingress for employees of a contractor en-
gaged in constructing an addition to the struck plant, although an
object of the picketing was to enlist the aid of the contractor's em-
ployees as well as that of employees of all other customers and sup-
pliers of the employer, because the picketing in this case was wholly
at the premises of the primary employer with whom the union was
engaged in a labor dispute.
The Board is evidently committed to the view that primary picket-
ing, that is, picketing at the premises of the employer with whom
there is a labor dispute, is not a violation of the section. In the In-
ternational Rice Milling Company case, supra, the Board held that
there was no violation when the union attempted to prevent a truck
from entering the employer's mill during a strike by the pickets ask-
ing the driver not to go in with the truck and upon his refusal and
driving in anyway, hurling rocks at the truck as it proceeded to the
mill. The union's activities arose out of primary picketing at the
employer's mill and were carried out in the immediate vicinity of
the mill. The Supreme Court in sustaining the Board against the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit placed considerable emphasis
on the fact that the union activities in this instance were aimed at
inducing or encouraging "individual" rather than "concerted" action
by the employees of the neutral employer.
While it is true that normally the situs of a labor dispute is the
premises of the primary employer, there are cases in which the situs
8. Senator Taft said of the Section: "This provision makes it unlawful to
resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person who is
wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between the employer and his em-
ployees . . . under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became im-
possible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of strike, no matter
how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the bill
does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts." 93 CONG.
REc. 4323 (Apr. 29, 1947). Senator Taft also stated that primary strikes
over terms and conditions of employment were "entirely proper" and "through-
out this bill are recognized as completely proper strikes". 93 CoNo. REc.
3950 (Apr. 23, 1947).
11
Irwin: Secondary Boycotts under the Taft-Hartley Act
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUART4RLY
of the dispute may not be limited to a fixed location; it may be am-
bulatory. Thus in the Schultz9 case, the Board held that the truck
upon which a truck driver worked was the situs of a labor dispute
between the union and the owner of the truck. The union in that
case was careful to identify the picketing in time and place with
the actual functioning of the primary employer's trucking operations.
by limiting such picketing to the immediate vicinity of Schultz's
trucks, the situs of the labor dispute. The pickets followed the trucks
and picketed them while they were unloading at the customer's place
of business, and when the trucks left, the pickets stopped picketing.
The picketing was held to be primary.
In the Sterling Beverages'o case the facts were: Sterling Drug
distributed Ruppert beer in Massachusetts. Sterling drivers, who
were members of a Massachusetts local of the Teamsters, picked up
their loads at Ruppert's brewery in New York City. New York
Local 807 of the Teamsters advised Sterling that it claimed jurisdic-
tion over certain of the driving done in New York City and that its
members should be employed to do such work. Sterling refused to
comply with the request. Pickets were set up by Local 807 at the
entrances to the loading platform. The Board found a violation of
Section 8(b) (4) (A) but based the decision principally on the grounds
that some picketing was carried on when no Sterling trucks were
at the loading dock, thereby distinguishing it from the Schultz case.
The Board said, "The line must be drawn somewhere, and this is
where we draw it". Although this would seem to imply that no,
violation would have existed bad the picketing been contemporaneous
with the presence of the Sterling trucks, the Board in such a case
could find a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (D) as it found in the
Direct Transit Lines" case.
In the Sailor's Union of the PacifiC 2 case the ambulatory situs
doctrine was extended somewhat. In that case, the union had a
labor dispute with a shipowner. There was no dispute with the
owner of the shipyard. The shipowner had a contract with the ship-
yard whereby the shipowner could put a crew aboard to train them
during the last two weeks of overhaul and also to load stores.
9. Teamsters Union, Local 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 25
L. R. R. M. 1122 (NLRB 1949).
10. Teamsters Union, Local 807 (Sterling Beverages, Inc.), 26,L. R. R. Al.
1213 (NLRB 1950).
11. Truck Drivers & Chauffeurs Union (Direct Transit Lines, Inc.), 27
L. R. R. M. 1316 (NLRB 1951).
12. Matter of Sailors' Union of the Pacific (AFL) and Moore Dry Dock
Co., 27 L. R. R. M. 1108 (NLRB 1950).
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At the time the picketing at the entrance to the shipyard was begun,
ninety per cent of the conversion job was completed. .The Board
held that there was no violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) because the
secondary employer (shipyard) was harboring the situs .(the ship)
of a dispute between the union and the primary employer (ship-
owner). The Board attached considerable weight to the contract
giving the shipowner the right to train crews and to load stores and
was careful to point out that it was not holding that a union which
has a dispute with a shipowner over working conditions of seamen
aboard a ship may lawfully picket the premises of an independent
shipyard to which the shipowner has delivered his vessel for over-
haul and repairs; but that it was. only holding that if a shipyard per-
mits the owner of a vessel to use its dock for the purpose of ready-
ing the ship for its regular voyage by hiring and training a crew and
by putting stores aboard ship (all of which the Board said was just
as much part of the normal business of the ship as the voyage itself),
then the union may lawfully picket the entrance to the shipyard to
advertise its dispute with the shipowner. The following conditions
have been laid down by the Board for picketing at a secondary em-
ployer's site to qualify as primary:
(1) the picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs
of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(2) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is en-
gaged in its normal business at the situs;
(3) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the.
location of the situs; and
(4) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the
primary employer.
The acute problem of applying the "primary situs" test has reached
its peak in the building trades disputes. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in a decision upheld by the Supreme Court, ruled
in the I.B.E.W. case, supra, that picketing against the job when a
third party subcontractor has been allowed to employ non-union labor
on the same premises is also secondary picketing of the principal
contractor under the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A). The case
did involve picketing when none of the non-union subcontractor's
men were on the job, but this would not appear to be a valid distinc-
tion because under the same state of facts, except that the non-union
men were on the job, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
13
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peals for the District of Columbia in the Denver Bitilding Trades13
rase. In that case the Court of Appeals had held that the picketing of
the project, which is picketing of the contractor as well as the subcon-
tractor against whom the union had a grievance, was not secondary
picketing. In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
placed considerable emphasis on the fact that at least one object,
although not necessarily the only object, of the picketing was to
force the general contractor to cease doing business with the sub-
contractor.
A safe assumption is that one of the purposes of prohibiting a
secondary boycott is to localize the labor dispute. In the building
trades cases the conflict is localized at the site of the construction,
and when the non-union subcofitractor is working on the job, it seems
to this writer that the general contractor could be said to be hous-
ing the situs of the non-union subcontractor and that the picketing
is directed at him at the only place where such would be effective.
Perhaps a better solution is to regard the "job" itself (since all con-
cerned have the same place of business) as the object of the union's
activity and with which it has the dispute and that as long as the
union has a labor dispute with anyone working on the job, 14 the
union's activity is protected.
Just who is a primary employer and who is a secondary employer
will probably remain in the realm of conjecture, for by the very
nature of the construction trade it would be extremely difficult to
determine the extent either employer was concerned with the em-
ployees -of the other in many factual situations. The two employers
are so enmeshed in carrying out the job that it would not be unfair
to the employers to permit the employees of either to demonstrate
lawfully against the whole project when one of the employers on that
project has been unfair.
IV.
The "unity of interest" doctrine' developed by the New York
Court of Appeals is predicated in the main upon the close economic
relationship between the primary employer and the secondary em-
ployer whose relationship (at least in a quasi-legal sense) is that
13. N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 "U. S.
675 (1951).
14. This should be distinguished from a case involving a supplier whose em-
ployees do not work on the job, which appears to be clearly an unfair practice.
N. L. R. B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F. (2d) 60 (CA 10
1950), certiorari denicd 341 U. S. 947 (1951).
1. See Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell 124 N. E. 97 (N Y. 1919);
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 11 N. E. 2d 910 (N. V. 1937).
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of principal and agent. In Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of
Areltitects,2 the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, undoubtedly influenced by this doctrine, refused
to grant the Board's Regional Director an injunction against an en-
gineers' union which sought, by picketing, to encourage employees
of a subcontractor to engage in a strike in order to compel the sub-
contractor to refuse to do engineering work for the primary employer.
The Court rested its decision on the ground that the subcontractor
was not engaged in "doing business" with the contractor within the
meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A). There, the subcontractor was en-
gaged in selling services of its employees to the contractor (primary
employer), who supervised the subcontractor's employees' work
which had substantially increased by reason of a strike against the
contractor. Under such circumstances the Court concluded that the
subcontractor was not a neutral but rather an ally of the contractor
and that it was the subcontractor's activity as an ally which directly
provoked the union's picket action. The Board has limited the doc-
trine to the precise facts of Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of
Architects, supra, or where the secondary company is substantially
owned, controlled, and operated by the primary employer.
The result of the district court decision is an equitable one because
otherwise the struck manufacturer might be able to subcontract his
regular work and break a strike by his employees. It would seem
that in such a case it should make no differenee that the primary
employer did not actually supervise the subcontracted work since
the subcontractor would, in effect, be little more than a professional
strikebreaker and hence hardly a neutral. It is interesting to note
in this respect that Senator Taft is willing to legalize a refusal to
handle "struck" work.8
The district court rule is no doubt the expression of a determina-
tion not to go beyond the purpose of protecting innocent third parties.
If this rule is to be followed, it will be very difficult to determine
whether or not the secondary employer is truly a disinterested third
party, because he is seldom wholly disinterested; therefore, the de-
gree of interest will have to be the determining factor.
2. 75 F. Supp. 672 (S. D., N. Y. 1948) ; 21 L. R. R. M. 2256.
3. 95 CONG. Rec. 8709 (June 30, 1949). During debates on Senate Bill 249,
Senator Taft said: "I may say that one of the changes we are making in the
law is to remove the ban on the secondary boycott in a case where there is a
strike in one plant and then the work is transferred to another plant, because
we feel that in that case the men who are striking should be able to picket
the second plant in order that the men there may not work on the work on
which the men in the first plant were refusing to work".
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The rule is also indicative of a widespread opinion that there
should be an "area of economic conflict" within which a union could
engage in a secondary boycott without interference by injunction.
It would not be desirable, however, for court decisions allowing the
use of secondary boycotts on one theory or another to become sub-
stantial because it would serve in the main to antagonize and furnish
ammunition to those critics of the courts whose line of attack is
centered around the tendency of the courts to legislate. It would
be the same thing in which the courts indulged after the passage of
the Clayton Act (on the other foot, of course), and such actions by
the courts encourage neither respect nor confidence.
A wiser course is for the Act to be strictly applied so that the
injustices will become readily apparent (although it is admitted that
this is small consolation to those who suffer the immediate injustice)
so that the legislative branch of the government will take corrective
action, under the pressure of enlightened public opinion, by amend-
ing the Act. Such amendment should recognize and provide for an
"area of economic conflict" where resort to the secondary boycott
could be had. A fair test of the union's right to so act would be the
degree of interest between the primary and secondary employers, the
means used by the union, and the object.
Many believe that the secondary boycott is essentially unjust be-
cause of the pressure being brought to bear on allegedly innocent
third parties. However, if the situation is examined in the light
of our complex industrial economic system, it will be seen that mere
primary pressure by a labor group against its immediate employer is
neither always effective nor possible, particularly when there is wide-
spread unemployment. Oftentimes resort to the use of the so-called
secondary boycott is the only possible means through which the union
can reach the employer. It would not be unfair to permit unions
to refuse to handle "struck" work and to protect union wages by
refusing to work on jobs hiring non-union labor. On the other hand,
the use of the secondary boycott does not seem to be justified in
jurisdictional disputes (Section 8(b) (4) (D) ), or when it is used to
compel an employer to bargain with one union when that employer is
required by Board order or certification to bargain with another
union (Section 8(b) (4) (C) ).
By the broad language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the courts
were prohibited from taking jurisdiction in labor disputes. This
was a direct attempt by Congress to prevent the courts' avoiding
the intent of Congress through interpretation as they did with the
16
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Clayton Act. As a result the purpose of the union activity became
practically immaterial insofar as the Federal Courts' power to enjoin
that activity was concerned. However, the framers of the Taft-
Hartley Act have completely eliminated the secondary boycott from
labor's arsenal, thereby seriously crippling organized labor's power
to reach certain employers. It is suggested that neither view is cor-
rect but rather that a workable solution to the problem lies some-
where between the extremes of the excessive liberality of pre-Taft-
Hartley days and the blanket prohibitions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
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